CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SIXTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 1 February 1994, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Gérard Errera (France)

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The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 668th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

First of all, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, I would like to welcome the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, Mr. Jaakko Blomberg, who will be addressing the Conference. Mr. Blomberg visited us on two occasions last year and his presence here again today attests to the sustained interest of his Government in the work of our Conference.

It is my intention first to give the floor to the speakers on the list for this meeting, and after that to take up the pending issues, namely, the appointment of the chairmen of the ad hoc committees and the special coordinators.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Finland, Algeria, the Russian Federation, Belgium and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. I now give the floor to the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, His Excellency Jaakko Blomberg.

Mr. BLOMBERG (Finland): First, Ambassador Errera, I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference, and assure you of the full cooperation of my delegation. I am convinced that under your leadership this year's session will get off to a smooth and efficient beginning. I would also like to use this occasion to welcome Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky as the new Secretary-General of the Conference, and Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail as the new Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference.

The international community has now embarked on the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Such a treaty will be a true step towards a more secure world. Finland will contribute to these negotiations. We support a rapid process that will lead into a worldwide treaty which will put an end to all nuclear testing, thereby strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. With intensive effort the bulk of the work could be done by the end of this year.

In this context, I wish to outline briefly our views on some key points in the coming negotiations. First, we support the scope of the treaty as proposed by Sweden in the revised draft which was presented in December last year. The Swedish text could serve as a basis for the negotiations. Second, a workable treaty requires effective verification. In this respect, the chemical weapons Convention established a modern standard. Seismic monitoring is the primary technical means for the verification system. The right to conduct challenge inspections is essential to determine that parties are not engaged in prohibited activities. It also serves as a deterrent to potential violators. Third, proper verification of the test ban requires proper organization. For reasons of technical competence and cost-effectiveness Finland believes that this task of the future treaty could best be handled within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is important that the test ban be negotiated in a multilateral setting. The

(Mr. Blomberg, Finland)

credibility of the treaty requires it. We hope that the Conference on Disarmament is able to move rapidly into practical negotiations in the working groups.

There is a wide range of activities involving the legacy of the cold war. In a short time, arms control has progressed remarkably. We welcome the most recent development, the trilateral agreement between the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States. When implemented, this agreement will lead to the removal of all the nuclear weapons that are presently in Ukraine. This agreement deserves the strong support of the world community. Finland supports the ongoing disarmament process within the territory of the former Soviet Union. In cooperation with IAEA, Finland has initiated a safeguards support programme in Ukraine. We have also applied for membership of the Moscow International Science and Technology Centre, and have allocated significant resources for our future participation.

Finland will work with many other States in all parts of the world to secure the indefinite and unconditional extension of the non-proliferation Treaty in 1995. The NPT is the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime. It serves our common security as no other international instrument can. It is imperative that the NPT continue to do so in the future. The vital role of the NPT is being recognized ever more widely. We welcome the accessions of Armenia, Belarus, Guyana and Mauritania to the NPT, as well as the decision of Kazakhstan to ratify it. These represent five important steps towards universality. We have also noted with satisfaction the announced intention of Algeria and Argentina to join the Treaty before the 1995 conference.

The recently concluded second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 1995 NPT conference took a number of important decisions. Finland was particularly happy to join in the endorsement of Ambassador Dhanapala of Sri Lanka as President of the 1995 conference. We will continue our active participation in the preparatory process.

Intensive efforts are called for in the prohibition of production of fissile material for weapons purposes. The CD already has a role to play on this issue. We hope that the consultations of the Special Coordinator will lead to the establishment of an ad hoc committee. In this area the CD should work in close cooperation with IAEA.

The strengthening of security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT or other legally binding multilateral instruments within the non-proliferation regime is an issue of growing importance. We believe that it is time to step up this work within the CD.

Questions related to conventional weapons and forces require growing attention. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms provides a worldwide effort in promoting stability and security through increased openness and transparency. The number of returns for the first data collection last year was promising. In further efforts, increasing the number of countries providing requested information for the Register is an important

(Mr. Blomberg, Finland)

goal. The Group of Governmental Experts that will meet during this year in New York will address further possibilities to develop the Register. The experience gained in the European context proves that there is a wide range of possibilities to increase openness and transparency. The CD, for its part, is expected to contribute in the area of transparency in armaments.

We regret that the expansion of the membership of the Conference is still pending. The solution to the question is important also with a view to truly multilateral participation in the negotiations on the test-ban treaty. The CD has a collective responsibility to make progress in this question. Since the expansion is a matter of great interest for us as a candidate, we would like this process to be carried forward in a transparent manner. We support the proposal presented by Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico in the plenary meeting on 25 January. This proposal is not the optimal solution. We would rather join immediately. But we do see this as a way to move forward in the expansion. My hope, Mr. President, is that you could bring this proposal rapidly forward for the consideration of the plenary meeting. A positive outcome on this would facilitate the work of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Algeria, Ambassador Meghlaoui.

Mr. MEGHLAOUI (Algeria) (translated from French): Mr. President, on behalf of the Algerian delegation, I would first of all like to join with those who have congratulated you on the occasion of your taking up the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. Your experience and your competence, which have been emphasized by mary colleagues, augur well for the success of our activities. The efficiency with which you are conducting our deliberations is beginning to bear fruit, because we have already reached an understanding on the programme of our work for 1994. We hope that we will be able to establish the main subsidiary bodies of the Conference without wasting time. This would be a good signal for the session now beginning. In that regard, the news we have learned this morning seems satisfactory. I wish you good luck, Sir, and assure you of the full cooperation of my delegation. I also wish to pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Zahran, for the invaluable efforts he made over a long and demanding period, and for the remarkable results he achieved.

We learnt with satisfaction that His Excellency, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, has been appointed to follow the activities of our body as Secretary-General. We welcome him. Mr. Petrovsky will be assisted by an official whose competence and qualities are well known, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail. We congratulate him on a promotion which is considered by all to be well deserved. We are convinced that our new Secretary-General, his deputy and their team will continue to make a discreet but always efficient contribution to the work of the Conference. I would not wish to fail to thank very sincerely all those who welcomed me, and you were the first to do so, Sir.

(Mr. Meghlaoui, Algeria)

For a number of years Algeria has been engaged in a process of accession to multilateral disarmament instruments. This process is part of a global approach. It is encouraged by the progress that has already been made in the spheres of disarmament. Thus, in January 1993 we were among the first to sign the Convention prohibiting chemical weapons. The ratification procedure is under way. We will be very pleased when the total elimination of this category of weapons becomes a reality. On the occasion of the inauguration of the nuclear reactor in Birine on 21 December last, our Minister for Foreign Affairs formally announced Algeria's intention to accede to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. In fact, the Algerian nuclear programme has never been at odds with the provisions of this Treaty. Our cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency has always been marked by total transparency, and we have concluded voluntary safeguards agreements with the Agency that cover the two nuclear facilities in the country.

Algeria has always devoted particular attention to the issues of non-proliferation and disarmament. Hence our great relief following the understanding that was reached during the inter-sessional period on the terms of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee entrusted with negotiating a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. We hope that this mandate will be implemented with the same spirit of cooperation, understanding and speed as that which presided over the discussions held under the effective guidance of Ambassador Tanaka. We also hope that the interest shown in the conclusion of a test-ban treaty will not be temporary. As we have already had occasion to say in the Ad Hoc Committee during the inter-sessional period, resolution 48/70, which describes the negotiation of such a treaty as a "priority task", was co-sponsored by almost 160 States Members of the United Nations and adopted by consensus. The Conference on Disarmament must therefore respond to this veritable appeal from the international community. In this regard, by submitting to a moratorium on nuclear testing throughout the period of the negotiations, the nuclear Powers would greatly contribute to the success of our work.

The prohibition of nuclear weapons, however, is not an end in itself. It is a step towards the advent of a denuclearized world. Other measures must be taken. The Conference on Disarmament is preparing to examine for the first time, in the context of item 2 on its agenda, questions dealing with the production of fissile material. We welcome this positive development, which originates in a move made by a nuclear Power. We too hope for the conclusion of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for military purposes. We encourage the special rapporteur to hold intensive consultations on this point and to work towards its consideration by the Conference on Disarmament in an Ad Hoc Committee with a negotiating mandate. The expertise of IAEA might be required to establish verification machinery.

If optimism is beginning to be justified, there is still no lack of grounds for disquiet. We will mention two. The first concerns what are commonly called negative security assurances. In the last statement which he made to the Conference on Disarmament, my predecessor, Ambassador Sémichi, expressed the concern of the Algerian Government at the lack of progress in

(Mr. Meghlaoui, Algeria)

the work of the Ad Hoc Committee dealing with this important issue. It is to say the least frustrating that 14 years after its establishment this Committee, which - need I recall? - has a negotiating mandate, continues at the end of each session to record the refusal of certain nuclear Powers to take into consideration the legitimate right of States that have voluntarily denied themselves the nuclear option not to be the subject of threats. Today, now that the international context has changed, the recognition, in a clear, multilateral and unequivocal treaty context, of the right to such guarantees is within our grasp. Let us not forget that this has a considerable influence on the future of the entire system of nuclear non-proliferation. Equally, let us not forget that the legitimate security needs of each State cannot be suppressed.

The second reason for disquiet that we shall mention - and it is not the last of them - concerns the prevention of an arms race in space. The Ad Hoc Committee is going to continue its work for the tenth consecutive year, and the discussions that take place there have not so far led to any result. The international situation has improved greatly and we think that it is high time to give this Committee a true negotiating mandate. We might consider, for instance, separating the efforts to develop means of reaching an understanding on confidence-building measures from the question which lies at the very origin of the establishment of the Committee, namely the drafting of a multilateral treaty to prevent the militarization of space. These would not be competing or exclusive approaches but could be complementary. We think that they could be considered in separate working groups, provided that consensus could be reached that would not give one an advantage over the other.

My delegation deeply regrets that the Conference on Disarmament was not able to overcome the obstacle that prevented its expansion last year. The delegations that had expressed their wish to become full members of the Conference found in Ambassador O'Sullivan the faithful spokesman of their concerns and the conclusions that he arrived at still enjoy our full support. We fear that the introduction of elements that are alien to the concerns of our Conference in the handling of the expansion issue might block this process indefinitely and cause the Conference to lose some of its credibility. The delegations of the 23 selected States have submitted a compromise proposal. This does them credit. It shows yet again the determination of these States to contribute to the work of the Conference. We are fully aware of this and we continue to hope that a solution may be found in the coming weeks.

Sir, in your introductory statement, you stated how much the recent evolution of international relations has created an oppressive dichotomy. We share your views to a great extent. At the same time as international disarmament agreements are being signed or tensions are diminishing, new conflicts are arising or reappearing after periods of latency. This contrast reflects the mass of problems facing the international community. In terms of the Conference on Disarmament and the task that has been assigned to it, it means that cooperation and understanding between the delegations present here will be vital in order to make an effective and consistent contribution to the efforts which will expedite disarmament and strengthen peace.

(M[illegible]eghlaoui, Algeria)

Before concluding I would like to reaffirm the attac[illegible] of Algeria to the efforts being undertaken in the fields of non-proli[illegible]ion and disarmament. However, this is the place to restate our c[illegible]ion that all States are entitled to access to science and technology for the purpose of development. We are aware of the complexity of this issue. But we think that this is a legitimate right. There is no development without peace; conversely, peace without development is an illusion. I would like to assure you, Sir, that my delegation will do its best to contribute to the success of the mission facing all of us and will lend you its full and undivided assistance.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Algeria for his statement and the kinds words addressed to the Chair, which I particularly appreciated. I now give the floor to the representative of the Russian Federation, Ambassador Berdennikov.

Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, first allow me to greet you as the representative of the friendly country of France and congratulate you on taking up the post of President of the Conference on Disarmament. You are taking the Chair at a highly crucial time when the essence of the question of the future role of the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in modern global politics is being resolved, when the Conference is being assigned new and complex tasks, first and foremost that of drawing up an international treaty relating to a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. We are convinced that you will be able to resolve successfully the procedural issues pertaining to the beginning of the session of the Conference. In this we are counting on your diplomatic skills, your many times proven capacity to find solutions to the most intricate problems. In carrying out the duties of President you can of course count on the cooperation and support of the delegation of the Russian Federation.

I would also like to thank your predecessor as President of the Conference, the Ambassador of Egypt, Mounir Zahran, for the work that has been done. We highly appreciate the efforts made by Ambassador Zahran during the final phase of the work of the Conference in 1993 and during the inter-sessional period, including the period during the session of the United Nations General Assembly. It is with pleasure that I welcome my compatriot, Ambassador Vladimir Fedorovich Petrovsky, to the post of Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General. I am convinced that the immense experience and well-deserved prestige of such a remarkable diplomat and scholar as Vladimir Fedorovich Petrovsky, with whom I have had the pleasure of working for many years, will help the Conference on Disarmament to take its proper place within the system of international relations in the new post-confrontation period. I cannot fail to congratulate my old friend Abdelkader Bensmail on his long-deserved appointment to the post of Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference. We value highly Mr. Bensmail's professionalism, profound knowledge and impartiality, which perfectly correspond to this new responsible post. I welcome the new representatives of Algeria, Venezuela, Italy and Ethiopia who have joined us recently and wish them every success.

(Mr. Berdennikov, Russian Federation)

It is now important to get the CD session off to a good and dynamic start in this new year of 1994. In this regard the message that United Nations Secretary-General B. Boutros-Ghali addressed to the Conference was very timely, in particular his accurate comment that the end of bipolarity has not diminished but has rather increased the need for disarmament. We endorse this important conclusion. The fact that this is indeed so is borne out by the emphasis placed on military and political issues during the recent Russian-American summit in Moscow. The Moscow Declaration, the joint statement by the Presidents of Russia and the United States on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery, the joint statement on issues of export control and policy in the area of transfers of conventional weapons and dual-use technologies, as well as a number of other documents adopted during that summit, give a practical dimension to the partnership between the two Powers. During the January meeting Russia and the United States embarked in earnest on the elaboration of measures intended to ensure the irreversible character of current and envisaged deep reductions in nuclear arsenals and to reinforce confidence in the nuclear field. In particular, agreement was reached that the Presidents of the two countries would order the detargeting of strategic nuclear missiles under the command of either side so that by no later than 30 May 1994 those missiles are not targeted. The joint Russian-American documents expressed satisfaction at the elimination of the vestiges of the "cold war", in particular the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls (COCOM), which is due to be abolished no later than 31 March 1994. Russia and the United States declared their readiness to cooperate in the establishment of a new multilateral export control regime which would not be directed against any State or group of States and which should control transfers of dangerous technologies and items in order to prevent their use for purposes that are incompatible with regional stability and non-proliferation regimes.

Among the important achievements of the Moscow summit were the trilateral arrangements between Russia, Ukraine and the United States recording Ukraine's commitment to transfer to Russia all nuclear munitions located on its territory for subsequent dismantling in the shortest possible time. Arrangements were made for Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus to be compensated in a fair and timely manner for the value of the highly enriched uranium in nuclear warheads located on their territory as they are transferred to Russia. An important aspect of the trilateral statement is the confirmation of the readiness of the depositaries of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to offer Ukraine security assurances once the START-1 Treaty enters into force and Ukraine becomes a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT. We hope that this will happen in the very near future.

Strengthening the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime in every way and making it universal are priority aspects of Russian foreign policy. In this connection we welcome the intention of Argentina and Algeria to joint the NPT. Russia firmly favours the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons at the 1995 conference. We are convinced that this Treaty is an effective instrument for the maintenance of international security and stability and corresponds to the interests of

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the entire international community. We view positively the results of the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 1995 conference which was recently held in New York. The decisions adopted, notably those related to the election of the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador J. Dhanapala, to the post of President of the Conference, the documentation that will have to be prepared for the 1995 conference and participation in the work of the Preparatory Committee and the Conference itself by States that have not yet joined the NPT and non-governmental organizations, are necessary steps in the preparations for this forum. As we see it, the main goal of the 1995 conference is to adopt a decision concerning the indefinite extension of the non-proliferation Treaty. This is a self-contained task, and it should not be linked to any other. From our point of view the indefinite extension of the NPT is of such importance for maintaining international peace and security that it would be wholly justified if a decision on this matter were adopted by the Conference with the participation of high-ranking representatives of States, for example Foreign Ministers. After adopting a decision on this matter the Conference could turn to other problems, including the issue of how different articles of the Treaty are being implemented.

As you know, during the Moscow meeting the Presidents of Russia and the United States of America expressed support for the speedy completion of negotiations on a CTB and declared their firm intention to provide political support for the negotiating process. The Presidents appealed to other States to refrain from carrying out nuclear explosions while these talks are being held. In this connection I would like to place special stress on Russia's readiness in principle to accept as of now a verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Our approach to the negotiations will be designed to ensure that they are largely completed if possible by spring 1995. These negotiations will undoubtedly be a priority activity of the Conference on Disarmament in 1994. They must receive the most favourable treatment in terms of organization at this Conference. We express our gratitude to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on an NTB at the last session of the Conference, Ambassador Yoshitomo Tanaka, under whose leadership not only important preliminary work for the negotiations was done, inter alia regarding the verification of the future treaty, but also a negotiating mandate was agreed for the Ad Hoc Committee.

I would like to share some of the views of the Russian delegation concerning the main provisions of the future CTB treaty. In our view the issue of the scope of the treaty should be resolved on the basis of existing international arrangements, primarily the 1963 Moscow partial test-ban Treaty, with the addition of course of a ban on underground tests. We believe it inadvisable to include in the scope of the treaty the issue of so-called preparatory activities for nuclear tests. Our studies of this issue demonstrate that, firstly, it is extremely difficult to identify preparatory activities for nuclear tests which are not dual-purpose in nature, and, secondly, a ban on preparatory activities would make the verification mechanism of the future treaty significantly more complicated and more expensive.

(Mr. Berdennikov, Russian Federation)

The CTB treaty should be of a non-discriminatory nature. By this we understand equal rights and obligations set forth in the treaty for all parties to it without any exclusions. Of course, the non-discrimination principle should also apply to the verification machinery that will be provided for in the treaty. The Russian delegation proposes that the treaty should provide for an effective international verification mechanism making maximum use of existing monitoring capabilities. During negotiations on the verification mechanism the Russian delegation will also pay close attention to the financial side of the issue, without detriment, of course, to the effectiveness of verification. The treaty should contain provisions on notifications of large-scale explosions involving chemical explosives and also allow for the possibility of international observation during the preparations for and the conduct of such explosions. In considering the question of the international organization for the implementation of the treaty, our main yardsticks will be competence and an acceptable level of costs associated with its establishment, running expenses and operations. The CTB treaty should be of unlimited duration. In connection with the need for the treaty to be truly effective in the sense of encompassing not only all the nuclear Powers but also States that have the potential to develop nuclear weapons, we are convinced that the treaty should enter into force after a certain number of instruments of ratification have been deposited - 65, for example - provided that they include the instruments of all States that on the date of the treaty's signature possess nuclear power stations and research reactors. The treaty should provide for the most stringent sanctions against a State party violating its main provisions, including the application by decision of the United Nations Security Council of economic or other coercive measures provided for in the United Nations Charter. The Russian delegation believes that the CTB treaty should not be linked with any other issues in the field of arms control or the strengthening of international security, and that no problems in those areas should be linked to a CTB treaty. Experience has demonstrated that, as a rule, linkages of any kind prove counterproductive. At the same time we of course recognize that there is an objective relationship between efforts to conclude the CTB treaty and the strengthening of the nuclear-weapon non-proliferation regime in all its aspects, as is reflected in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on an NTB adopted by the Conference.

The Russian delegation also supports the early initiation at our Conference of negotiations on a multilateral agreement on a verifiable ban on the production of fissile weapons materials. This measure is long overdue and would contribute significantly to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It would also be a step forward in the process of nuclear disarmament. We believe that not only all the nuclear Powers but also countries that are potentially capable of producing nuclear explosive devices and have the appropriate plants - essentially for uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing - should become parties to such an agreement. The future convention should place a reliable impediment in the way of the further production of highly enriched uranium and the extraction of plutonium for weapons purposes, and should stipulate IAEA controls. It should not apply to materials already stockpiled. At the same time, we believe it appropriate to examine the need to ban transfers to other countries of fissile weapons

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materials from existing stockpiles. We proceed from the view that the Conference on Disarmament could also make use of the extensive expertise of IAEA in this area. Individual expert meetings in Vienna or Geneva drawing on the Agency's expertise could provide a useful input for the development of a political/legal instrument in the CD. The Russian delegation supports your intention, Mr. President, to appoint a special coordinator on this issue to prepare the ground for negotiations.

I would like to remind you, in this context, that at their January meeting in Moscow the Presidents of Russia and the United States agreed to establish a joint working group which, inter alia, would explore the possibility of placing part of their fissile materials under IAEA safeguards. Special attention in this connection will be devoted to materials released in the process of nuclear disarmament and steps aimed at precluding the reuse of those materials for nuclear-weapon purposes. As for Russia, we are also prepared to agree that all the nuclear Powers should place under international control - under IAEA auspices - weapons materials released as a result of the elimination of nuclear weapons subject to reductions. In the interests of transparency we are prepared to consider the issue of exchanges of data on the quantities of such materials and their storage facilities.

As is well known, the Russian delegation has consistently called for the initiation of substantive negotiations aimed at developing a multilateral agreement - perhaps a convention - on effective security guarantees to non-nuclear States. Under such an agreement nuclear and non-nuclear States would make undertakings to one another. In the event, however, that other States are not yet ready for such an option, practical work could be begun with a view to developing a joint formula for "negative" assurances applicable to all five nuclear States. Such a formula could later be placed before the United Nations Security Council in order to give it mandatory status in international law. We propose that in parallel with the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on "negative" assurances, consultations among the five nuclear States should be started as soon as possible, with a view to developing such a joint formula. We are sure that all the conditions exist for the success of this work. In this connection I should like to recall that during the Moscow summit it was agreed that Russia and the United States would jointly consider appropriate ways of strengthening security assurances for States that have renounced the possession of nuclear weapons and strictly abide by their obligations in that regard.

The Russian delegation considers that the issue of the admission of new members into the Conference on Disarmament should be settled without further delay. We support the proposal on this issue made by the Special Coordinator, Ambassador O'Sullivan, that an additional 23 States which have made appropriate statements of their wish to become full members of the Conference should be admitted as members of the Conference. One cannot but regret that no general agreement has yet been reached on this matter, and was not reached at the inter-sessional consultations held under the guidance of the President of the Conference. In order to get things moving we would be prepared to support any consensus that may take shape on the proposal made at the meeting of the Conference on 25 January by the representative of Mexico and supported

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by the representative of New Zealand, speaking on behalf of all 23 countries included in the list prepared by the Special Coordinator. This proposal is of course far from ideal, primarily because it postpones sine die the time when the new members will be able to take their place among us. Nor is it clear what conditions must be met for this to happen. In connection with the new proposal made by the representative of Mexico, it seems we would once again have to return to the question of appointing a new special coordinator on the question of the expansion of membership.

The Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral forum of the international community in the area of disarmament, faces global tasks. The Russian delegation will spare no effort to ensure that the Conference can make its contribution to accomplishing these tasks.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Russian Federation for his statement and for his kind words addressed to me, of which I was particularly appreciative. I now give the floor to the representative of Belgium, Ambassador Guillaume.

Baron GUILLAUME (Belgium) (translated from French): Mr. President, first of all allow me to join my colleagues in expressing the full confidence of my delegation in you in the important functions you are undertaking to assume. You told us that it was fate that put you in this position at this time; we consider that your fate constitutes our good fortune. I also wish to welcome the new colleagues who have joined us - Mr. Palmeira Lampreia of Brazil, Mr. Sánchez Arnau of Argentina, Mr. Omar of Ethiopia, Mr. Meghlaoui of Algeria, Mr. Tarre Murzi of Venezuela and Mr. Vattani of Italy. As of now I can assure them of the full cooperation of my delegation. But I would also like to join my colleagues in welcoming the presence among us of our new Secretary-General, Mr. Petrovsky, Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, and the new Deputy Secretary-General, Mr. Bensmail. We will value their assistance.

The new colleagues whom I have just mentioned join us in this forum at a crucial time for the Conference on Disarmament. Just a year ago the Conference, in drawing up the treaty on chemical weapons, proved that a few countries - if they were motivated by sufficient determination - could devise a system of international commitments that was subsequently endorsed by four fifths of the States on the planet. To what do we owe this success? I think essentially to our methods of work. As they are based on the rule of consensus, we could not build rules to be imposed on a country unless it had previously accepted them. We could persuade, we could not impose. Hence the importance of mutual confidence in all our work. We may have different approaches, often we even have divergent philosophies, but if we have a common aim, if we have the will to reach it, we will succeed if we maintain a climate of total confidence among us. This climate of confidence made possible the drawing up of the treaty on chemical weapons, which remains to date the CD's best claim to fame, but it also presides over the work of the various ad hoc groups of the Conference. We can even see it in the title of some, as in the case of NSAs, but we see it above all in the entire philosophy which determines our work: how can we speak of transparency in armaments, how can

(Baron Guillaume, Belgium)

we accept the principle of participating in arms registers, if there is not at the base this confidence that I am referring to here? In this body we have created a climate of collective confidence; it generated equally collective responsibility. This is the consideration that prevailed yesterday in choosing the CD as a forum for the negotiation of a CTBT; it is the best argument for deciding tomorrow to add to our work the negotiations on a ban on the production of fissile material for military purposes. The most important task that awaits us this year is the negotiation of a treaty on the halting of nuclear tests. We have to set to work urgently and I would like to take this chance to thank and congratulate Ambassador Tanaka for his excellent work in setting us on the right track as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group until now. We must begin immediately, without more ado, even though we might regret the fact that all the attempts that have been made so far to broaden the membership of the CD have been unsuccessful. In this field, Belgium thinks that we should be able to receive in the Conference any country that shares the same objectives as ours and is ready to seek ways and means of reaching them on the basis of the confidence described above.

There is a saying in English: "Where there's a will there's a way". For this particular issue, we all clearly announced on 10 August last our resolve to reach an agreement on halting nuclear tests: it is for us to seek ways and means of bringing this about. Belgium is a country that has never had the ambition of becoming a nuclear Power, but recognized the positive role that nuclear weapons have played in maintaining peace for almost half a century. Nuclear weapons intimidate, and that is their role in deterrence, but they are also extremely dangerous and that is why we uphold non-proliferation. In order to bring this about, we must first of all give guarantees and reassure those that have none. We will succeed in producing an agreement on the halting of nuclear tests only if it is accompanied by a series of verification measures designed to allay the fears of all concerned. This is the most important point in the entire negotiation and you may be assured that Belgium will do everything within its power to reach the desired result. To that end it is necessary to devise an effective international system that is capable not only of detecting a nuclear test that has occurred but will also sound the alarm if any nuclear tests are imminent. We are not here only to note the violation of international obligations, we are gathered here in the interest of non-proliferation. The verification system we set up must therefore take into account everything that precedes a nuclear test and can give warning of its imminence. In this connection, we note that the negotiations on banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes is also something we are going to have to confront with the need for the development of a verification system: this could to a substantial extent complement the one we will set up for the CTBT. Let us therefore devise an effective multilateral system that will encompass these aspects, but let us keep it flexible and financially manageable. The experience of IAEA could be very useful to us in this matter. We know the objective, we have the context; on the basis of past experience, we have an exceptional climate of confidence. I have no doubt that under your guidance we will have the drive necessary to ensure a rapid and sound start to our work.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Belgium for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me, which I appreciated. I now call on the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Mr. Han.

Mr. HAN (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Mr. President, my delegation, at the outset, would like to warmly congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference.

Last year, the President of the Conference appealed to the Conference not to continue the debate on specific issues, namely the Korean peninsula's nuclear problems, out of consideration for the characteristics of the Conference and for the positive progress of its business. It was the same advice given by the secretariat last year and even this year. My delegation fully accepted and respected these opinions and advice. So we did not intend to raise these questions in this forum at the outset of the Conference. On the opening day this issue was raised again by certain delegations - by the United States and France - therefore, my delegation could not but explain our position to the Conference once again.

As is already known, the DPRK and the United States sides published a joint statement after reaching an agreement on the matters of principle for the solution of the nuclear problem and they had talks on this basis. In the joint statement, the two sides confirmed the basic principles of the solution to the nuclear problem: to refrain from nuclear threats; respect each other's sovereignty; ensure a fair obligation of full safeguards; and the United States' support for the peaceful reunification of Korea and it clearly defined the DPRK and the United States as the parties vested with the chief responsibility and authority for the solution of this problem. According to this, we have taken practical measures for the solution of the nuclear problem and acted in good faith in the course of the talks, until today. With the publication of the DPRK/United States joint statement, we unilaterally suspended the effectuation of our declaration on our withdrawal from the Non-proliferation Treaty and resumed negotiations with IAEA and the North-South dialogue. And, under this auspicious situation, we totally froze the movement of nuclear material within the DPRK to fulfil our commitment to provide the transparency of our nuclear activities and allow inspections to ensure the continuity of safeguards in this regard. Particularly, we made a big, bold decision to replace the existing graphite-moderated reactors with light water reactors, sacrificing the independence of our nuclear power industry in order to fundamentally dispel the so-called suspicion of nuclear development against the DPRK. All these efforts have, however, failed to call forth a practical response from the other parties and the current situation is developing in the opposite direction. This is attributable to the faithless stance of the United States side, a party to the bilateral negotiations.
I would like to inform the Conference of the main contents of the statement of the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs yesterday, 31 January 1994. The content of the statement is as follows.

"The process of a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula has recently run up against a grave challenge.

(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

"The United States has created a momentous crisis that is likely to develop into a catastrophe, at this crucial juncture when prospects are in sight for saving the DPRK/United States talks from the current deadlock and striking a package solution to the nuclear issue.

"As is already known, toward the end of last year the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States agreed on immediate future measures aimed at holding a third round of the talks and reaching a package solution to the nuclear issue, under which the United States will cancel its 'Team Spirit' joint military exercises for 1994 and the DPRK will accept inspection of limited scope on its nuclear facilities required to ensure the continuity of the safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

"Accordingly, it is within the framework of the DPRK/United States agreement and with our extraordinary patience and maximum tolerance that we have so far discussed with the IAEA secretariat the scope of the inspection intended to provide the continuity of the safeguards.

"The IAEA secretariat, however, has deliberately ignored the unique status of the DPRK, which set a moratorium on its declared withdrawal from the NPT and tried to force full-scope inspections equivalent to the DPRK's de facto return to the Treaty, inspections on which the DPRK and the United States could reach an accord at their future talks, instead of the inspection designed for the continuity of the safeguards.

"The demand for full-scope inspection clearly goes against the spirit of the bilateral agreement and it is absolutely beyond discussion at all at this point in time, when the United States nuclear threat remains yet to be removed, the IAEA's partiality and injustice remain yet to be redressed - factors that triggered off the DPRK's withdrawal from the Treaty.

"This notwithstanding, the United States, a party to the bilateral talks, has never tried to help straighten out the IAEA secretariat's misconduct but completely reversed the bilateral agreement on the inspection designed exclusively for the continuity of the safeguards and officially urged the DPRK to accept the demand of the IAEA secretariat for full-scope inspections.

"The United States has gone to the length of imposing a deadline for this and issued an ultimatum that it will not agree to hold a third round of the DPRK/United States talks but seek 'sanctions' unless the DPRK accepts IAEA's demand.

"What should be noted seriously is that the United States has again broached the 'special inspection' of the DPRK's two military sites, which have no relevance at all to its nuclear activities, and taken the lead in the ruckus for international pressure on the DPRK.

(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

"All the facts clearly prove that, so far, the stated United States preference for a negotiated resolution of the issue and its busy come-and-go are, in the final analysis, simply a stratagem aimed at devising a pretence for strangling the DPRK and at stalling for time needed to this end.

"The United States machinations of strangling the DPRK have been proved self-evidently by the new war manoeuvres the United States has been pursuing behind the screen of the DPRK/United States talks.

"In violation of its repeated commitment to the principle of assurances against the threat and use of force, the United States plans to defiantly go ahead with its large-scale nuclear war exercises against my country, including the 'Team Spirit' joint military exercises.

"United States officials say that they plan to continue other joint military exercises if they cannot conduct the 'Team Spirit' joint military exercises this year, and they even say openly that these exercises should be held in Hawaii, if it is not possible in South Korea.

"When we proposed the United States cancellation of the 'Team Spirit' joint military exercises as a major agenda for the talks, our objective was to eliminate the United States nuclear threat against the DPRK once and for all, not just to demand the military exercises.

"The United States posture for 'resolving' the nuclear issue with its nuclear war exercises going on against the other party to the dialogue is a mockery against the DPRK and negation of the dialogue itself.

"What we cannot overlook is the fact that the United States hardline and conservative forces are pressing ahead on a full scale with the deployment of the 'Patriot' missiles in South Korea, as part of their attempts to overpower the DPRK militarily.

"Nobody in the world will believe that the United States has the intention to resolve the issue, as the United States launches smile diplomacy at the negotiation table, as if it were interested in the withdrawal of its nuclear weapons, while frantically engaged in the deployment of its missiles to be trained on the other dialogue party from behind the scenes.

"This notwithstanding, the United States State Department spokesman's sophistry that the deployment of the United States missiles can in no way be considered provocative to the DPRK is really the height of impudence.

"The United States new war machinations do not stop here.

(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

"The United States Administration sent the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to South Korea in the early days of the new year for a huddle on the 'greater intelligence activities vis-à-vis North Korea' - a strong indication of the full-scale stage of the war preparations.

"It is not difficult now to guess that the United States will move to contrive pretexts for a shift to real military actions.

"In the light of this, it has become clear to anyone that the IAEA secretariat has intentionally delayed consultations with us until the films and batteries of the surveillance cameras installed at the DPRK's nuclear facilities will have run out, and now begun attempting full-scope inspections in an intriguing manner, and that these moves have been made in pursuit of the calculated stratagem of the United States.

"All the facts clearly show that the United States has no intention at all to resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula peacefully but still remains unchanged as ever in its ulterior objectives to strangle the DPRK by force at any cost.

"With regard to the current crisis due to the despicable and dangerous actions of perfidy on the part of the United States, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea solemnly declares its position as follows:

"First, if the United States defiantly goes ahead and reverses the promise it has made to the DPRK, the DPRK will no longer be bound by the promise it has made to the United States.

"The DPRK's promise to the United States includes all the goodwill measures and commitments it has taken so far unilaterally for the continued DPRK/United States talks and for a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue, such as the suspension of the effectuation of its announced withdrawal from the NPT, the freeze of all nuclear activities and the declared intention to renounce the graphite-moderated reactor system.

"Second, if the United States has no intention to hold any further round of talks, the DPRK, too, will have no intention to do so.

"It will be a gross miscalculation if the United States considers the DPRK/United States talks as an offering to the DPRK.

"The DPRK has consistently called for negotiations with the United States since the first days of the origination of the nuclear issue, in order to peacefully resolve the issue, not to seek any benefit from the United States.

"We have so far lived on our own without any relations with the United States, we can live well on our own in the future, too, and we have become constitutionally adapted to such a life.

(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

"Third, if the United States decides to take other options, we will also take our own countermeasures.

"In no way does the right of choice belong to big countries only."

This is the content of the statement of the spokesman of DPRK's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): We have just heard the statement by the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. This statement prompts me to make two comments, the first in my capacity as President and the second in my capacity as national representative.

As President, I would like to recall here forcefully that the Conference on Disarmament is a multilateral body for the negotiation of disarmament measures and not a forum to make unfounded accusations or engage in uncalled-for bilateral invective. All this severely tries everyone's patience, particularly that of the President. I would therefore appeal to the sense of restraint of certain participants to maintain the dignity of our work and the character of our Conference. This will be the last warning I will issue as President; such an attitude will not be tolerated in the future.

In my capacity as representative of France, I cannot allow the remarks made by the representative of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea to go without comment, since he mentioned my country at the beginning of his statement, in addition to the United States. My delegation has many times had occasion to reiterate its position on the issue of the need for North Korea to abide by its international commitments, particularly the application of IAEA safeguards in accordance with the commitments it has entered into. These commitments have been clearly defined by the Board of Governors of IAEA, the General Conference of IAEA and the United Nations Security Council, on behalf of the international community as a whole. In other words, it is unacceptable for us to hear anyone challenge the impartiality of the International Atomic Energy Agency and its secretariat, when all countries acknowledge the exemplary nature of the Agency's activities. Nor is it acceptable to reduce this matter to a bilateral quarrel or a regional issue. As we have already had occasion to say twice, and have also said in this forum, because it has to do with respect for an international standard, this issue concerns us all. Therefore only respect by North Korea for its commitments, duly acknowledged by IAEA, will be capable of satisfying the international community. That is the end of the statement I wished to make in my capacity as representative of France.

We have thus reached the end of the list of speakers for today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor at this stage? I see that none does. I now invite the Conference to turn to the question of the appointment of the chairmen of the ad hoc committees and special coordinators on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, the expansion of the membership of the Conference,

(The President)

and the agenda of the Conference. I am pleased to be able to announce that the particularly intensive consultations which I conducted on these matters have produced the following proposals, which I now put before the Conference.

I propose that Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico should take the Chair of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. May I take it that the Conference so decides?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I propose that Ambassador Wolfgang Hoffmann of Germany should take the Chair of the Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons. May I take it that the Conference so decides?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I propose that Ambassador György Boytha of Hungary should be appointed Chairman of the Committee on Transparency in Armaments. May I take it that the Conference accepts this proposal?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I now come to the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. I understand that the Group of 21 will be putting forward a candidate for this post in the next few days, and I hope that the Conference will be able to make the appointment at our next plenary meeting.

I also propose that Ambassador Gerald Shannon of Canada should be appointed special coordinator in charge of seeking the views of members on the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. May I take it that the Conference decides to accept this proposal?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I also propose that Ambassador Lars Norberg of Sweden should be appointed special coordinator on the issue of the Conference's agenda. May I take it that the Conference decides to accept this proposal?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Lastly, on the subject of the expansion of the membership of the Conference, as the Conference will recall, we had also decided to designate a special coordinator. In the meantime the representative of Mexico placed a proposal before the Conference at its first

(The President)

plenary meeting. It would therefore seem desirable for the Conference to take a certain amount of time before it decides on this proposal. It is therefore my intention to begin consideration of the Mexican proposal as of tomorrow in the consultations I will hold with the group coordinators and China at 3.30 p.m. in the secretariat conference room on the sixth floor. Hence it seems reasonable to me, since it is a question of appointing a special coordinator on this issue, to take a decision only after this period of reflection, which means, if you are agreeable, on 10 February at the latest.

I would like to convey my heartfelt congratulations to the chairmen of the ad hoc committees and the special coordinators whom we have just appointed and wish them every success in their work. I would also like to express here my warm thanks to all the delegations for their flexibility and the spirit of compromise they have demonstrated during the intensive consultations which have enabled us to plan a speedy start to our substantive work. I intend to hold a meeting very shortly with the ad hoc committee chairmen and special coordinators to consider with them the timetable for future meetings, which I hope to put before the Conference as soon as possible. At this stage Ambassador Marín Bosch has asked me to inform the Conference that he intends to hold his first organizational meeting on Thursday, 3 February at 3.30 p.m. in this room.

We have now reached the end of our agenda for today. Is there any delegation wishing to take the floor at this stage? I give the floor to Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): The chairmen of the ad hoc committees do not usually speak in this Conference on the very day of their appointment. However, I would like to say a few words on the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. I shall not try to conceal the pleasure that I feel at this appointment. As I had occasion to say at our inaugural meeting a week ago, Mexico has been a tireless promoter of the complete prohibition of nuclear tests. As a student of Alfonso García Robles and Luis Padilla Nervo, this appointment has very special significance for us. At the first meeting of the Ad Hod Committee, which will take place on Thursday, 3 February in the afternoon, as you announced, I will invite the members and observers of this Conference to engage in an intensive dialogue with a view to expediting our work on this topic of key importance for all of us. This dialogue will be designed to bring about agreement on the provisions of the future treaty. To use the English expression, it will be a "treaty-specific" dialogue. I would also like to place on record our appreciation for the results achieved in the Ad Hoc Committee in 1993 under the guidance of Ambassador Tanaka. Allow me to conclude by thanking the members of the Conference, and very specially my colleagues in the Group of 21, for their solidarity and support.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Ambassador of Mexico for his statement. If no other delegation wishes to take the floor, I intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 3 February 1994 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.